Governing the Commons from Communities to Markets by Kuk, George
 Governing the Commons from Communities to Markets 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 1 





Nottingham Business School 





Open source software is central to the argument of inclusion of community-based 
production as a new form of organizing for growth and innovation. However, whether 
the same can be applied by embedding the market-based production in the solidarity 
and social-trust based systems remains theoretically unclear and largely unexplored 
empirically. Building on prior research on governing the commons, we revise the 
theoretical framing of exclusion and subtractability to underline their inverse and 
reciprocal relationship. We examine the genealogy of community-based production 
from communities to markets and further use two contemporary cases to illustrate 1) 
how exclusion leads to underuse and underinvestment from the business investor’s 
perspective, 2) how subractability facilitates business investment without crowding out 
nonprofit contributors, and 3) how actors self-organize to address the social and 
business dilemma, ensuring that both community and market-based production can 
more effectively adapt, innovate and survive in the long term. 
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Introduction 
Open source software is central to the argument of inclusion of community-based production models as a 
catalyst for change and a new form of organizing for growth and innovation (Benkler, 2002; Benkler & 
Nissenbaum, 2006; Fjeldstad, et al., 2012; O’Mahony, 2007). However, whether the same can be applied 
by embedding the market-based production in the solidarity and social-trust based systems (Benkler 
2012; Stefik 1997a, 199b) remains theoretically unclear and largely unexplored empirically. Existing 
models of organizing have positioned the community and the market-based production on diametrically 
opposite sides of the periphery of the core. For example, the community-based production tends to listen 
to the most sophisticated users in producing goods that are socially and culturally meaningful (Benkler, 
2002; von Hippel, 2001) whereas the market-based production tends to listen to the mainstream users as 
a means to bolster consumption (e.g. Nadeau, 1999). Also, the communities tend to consume what they 
produce whereas the markets often behave opportunistically as a free rider, hijacking the social 
production and seeking to externalize the risks and the labor and R&D costs to the communities. Despite 
the differences in emphasis, community and market-based production are continually intertwined in 
practice (Fitzgerald, 2006). Some of the existing theoretical models tend to downplay the differences in 
the governing of software commons from a public good lens (e.g. von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). Yet the 
tension between community and market-based production remains and still needs to be accounted for 
both theoretically and empirically.   
This paper aims to re-examine some of the inherent challenges of co-organizing community and market-
based production in governing software and hardware commons from communities to markets. Prior 
research on governing the commons has been primarily theorized from the perspective of nonprofit 
participants (e.g. Di Tullio & Staples, 2013; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). This excludes the much-
needed perspective of business actors as they often invest in open source projects through endorsement, 
sponsorship and direct contribution to the codebase (e.g. Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008; Roberts et al., 
2006; von Krogh et al., 2012). The intertwined relationship between the community and the market-
based production is integral to some of the firms’ strategies in leveraging open source software for growth 
and innovation (e.g. Fosfuri, Giarrnatana, Luzzi, 2008; Wen, Ceccagnoli & Forman, 2015). Yet the 
differences of emphasis between social virtues and utility maximization have made the co-organizing task 
inherently challenging, in particular balancing a somewhat asymmetrical relationship to yield 
complementary benefits from the perspectives of both nonprofit and business contributors (Kivleniece & 
Quélin, 2012). As such, we need to find a theoretical middle ground of bringing the community and the 
market-based production to work alongside each other. 
Co-organizing community and market-based production 
This paper explores this middle ground by revising the relationship between excludability and 
subtractability (Ostrom, 1990). Initially, economists used these two constructs to describe the 
characteristics of four types of goods. They include: public good, which is non-excludable and non-
subtractable; and common pool resource, which is non-excludable but subtractable. A good is said to be 
non-excludable if it is difficult for a contributor to stop a non-contributor from enjoying the good (i.e. the 
condition of high difficulty of exclusion). A non-subtractable good is said to be indivisible when the 
consumption by one will not diminish its availability of the amount left to others. This is particularly 
problematic for governing the common pool resources as they are subject to the deleterious effect of 
excessive and unmonitored consumption. However, contributors to common pool resources often engage 
among themselves to set rules against excessive consumption (Ostrom, 2003). This ability to self-govern 
through rule-based systems has been extended to understand governing software commons primarily 
through the use of either restrictive or permissive licenses (O’Mahony, 2003; Santos et al., 2013).  
The software common gives anyone the freedom of using, modifying, and distributing the source code. It 
prevents any attempts of enclosing the software common as a commodity. In its earlier release under 
GNU Public License, it obligates those who redistribute software to make available any modified source 
code. The question of how the software common is governed remains an important area of research across 
disciplines and fields of studies including organization studies and information systems research. This 
study focuses on governing the commons under permissive licensing agreement. In contrast to GNU 
public licenses, permissive licenses make no obligation of source-code disclosure. Although it induces 
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commercial exploitation, it inadvertently creates the problem of free riding for both nonprofit and 
business actors. The latter is often regarded as free riders as they seek to commercially exploit the 
software common without having to contribute to its maintenance and core development. Despite the 
consumption of the software common will not diminish the availability to others, their behaviours are 
rivalrous as they can discourage non-profit participants from continuously maintain and contribute to the 
software common. Yet on the other hand, in the case of GNU public license, it can discourage commercial 
use and exclude any possibility of business contribution and development. This public and private 
appropriation presents a unique kind of social and business dilemma, which requires a balancing act 
between contribution and rivalry from both the non-profit and business actors.  
 
   
Figure 1a. Non-contributor’s perspective      Figure 1b. Business investor’s perspective 
 
Thus far, governing software commons generally assume a positive co-dependency between contribution 
and consumption from a non-contributor’s perspective (see Figure 1a). But by shifting the perspective to a 
business investor, the relationship between the difficulty of exclusion and subtractability is inversed. At 
the end of community-based production, restrictive licenses present a high degree of subtractability to the 
non-contributors (Figure 1a) whereas the degree of subtractability is reversed from the business actors’ 
perspective. The community-based production undermines the business incentive to invest because the 
business investors are unable to stop non-contributors including their business rivals to appropriate their 
investment (Figure 1b). Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the proposed relationship. In contrast to the original 
depiction from the perspective of a non-contributor, the two constructs: difficulty of exclusion and 
subtractability vary inversely. In this paper, we seek to demonstrate the inherent challenges of embedding 
market-based production as an integral part of community-based production.  
The proposed framework seeks to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, it shifts away from 
consumption to the reciprocal relationship between production and consumption, considering 
subtractability not only from the perspectives of non-contributors but also the business investors. Second, 
it seeks to address the problems of underuse in terms of underinvestment from communities to the 
markets. This is particularly important in making lines of source code variable to both sophisticated users 
and mainstream users. 
In following sections, we first provide a genealogy of the nature and characteristics of community-based 
production including its clash with market-based production and the discords and resolutions from 
within the developer and user communities. We seek to use the inductive insights in governing software 
commons and to extend to the study of hardware commons. Finally, we will introduce the background of 
two cases in an on-going study of commons and offer some preliminary findings and conclusion.  
From Communities to Markets 
The clash of practice between community and market-based production was first illustrated in the 
discords between Microsoft and the hacker communities. In 1976 when software mass markets were still 
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to form, Microsoft founder Bill Gates sent his famous letter – “An Open Letter to Hobbyists” addressed to 
the members of the Homebrew Computing Club to warn the early hackers on free distribution of 
commercial software; notably, at that time Gates did not believe hackers could have the motivation to 
write any competing software (Gates, 1976): 
“Who can afford to do professional work for nothing? What hobbyist can put three- man years into 
programming, finding all bugs, documenting his product and distribute for free? The fact is, no one 
besides us has invested a lot of money in hobby software.” 
And yet the hacker’s culture of contributing and exchanging of source code and allowing one another to 
“free-ride” begun in two main settings: the academic institutions (such as Berkeley and MIT), and 
corporate research facilities (such as Bell Labs and Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Centre). Within these 
settings, the cooperative development efforts focused on building an operating system that could run on 
multiple computer platforms. Successful examples, such as Unix and the C language used for developing 
AT&T’s Unix applications were originally developed at AT&T’s Bell Laboratories in 1969. The initial 
growth of Unix was slow, as by early 1973, there was only about sixteen installations, all of which within 
the confines of Bell Labs. However, Unix saw a dramatic change at the Association for Computing 
Machinery Symposium after Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie jointly presented a paper on Unix. 
Thereafter, Bell Labs was inundated with a multitude of requests for copies of Unix. The software was 
then installed across institutions, licensed out by AT&T with full source code under a trade secret 
agreement at marginal cost with minimal licensing terms. Users were encouraged to develop the system 
further as a practical necessity since AT&T’s approach to Unix was “no support, no bug fixes and no 
credit” (Salus, 1994). An evident implication of AT&T’s policy was for Unix to form the basis for the first 
large-scale community-based model of production. 
Further innovations were made on many of the sites where the software was installed and in turn this was 
shared by others. The process of code sharing was greatly accelerated with the diffusion of Usenet; a 
computer network began in 1979 to link together the Unix programming community. As the number of 
sites grew rapidly (e.g. from three in 1979 to four hundred in 1980), the ability of programmers in 
university and corporate settings to rapidly share technologies was considerably enhanced (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2002). The community-based production projects were undertaken on a highly informal basis with 
no effort to delineate property rights or to restrict use. But in the early 1980s, this informality proved to be 
problematic when AT&T began enforcing its “purported” intellectual property rights related to Unix, after 
having realised its true commercial value AT&T decided not to release Unix’s source code for the first time 
and to fully commercialize Unix. The plan was followed through in 1983 after AT&T’s deregulation. As 
such it was not bound to license Unix at minimal cost but at market price (which ran as high as 
US$250,000). 
In response to the threats of litigation, the first effort to formalise the ground rules behind the 
community-based production emerged, based on a novel form of licensing. This was pivotal to an 
important development with two schools of thoughts on the direction and philosophy of open-source 
movement: one represented by Richard Stallman’s GNU Public Licence (hereinafter, GPL) and the other 
Berkeley Software Development Licence (hereinafter, BSD) on open-source movement’s direction and 
philosophy. Richard Stallman, a former programmer at MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, was 
increasingly distraught by both AT&T and other software firms as they moved towards the commercial 
business model. In backlash, Stallman, started his GNU project and published the GNU manifesto in 1983 
and founded the Free Software Foundation (hereinafter, FSF) in 1985. 
The licensing procedure aimed to preclude the assertion of patent rights concerning cooperatively 
developed software. In exchange for being able to modify and distribute the software, software developers 
had to agree to make the source code freely available or at nominal cost whilst the user had to agree not to 
impose licensing restrictions on others. In addition, all enhancements to the code and/or code that inter-
mingled the cooperatively developed software with that developed separately had to be licensed on the 
same terms. With this innovative copyleft licence, Stallman was able to avoid the exclusive effects of 
copyright with the help of copyright itself. In 1989, Emacs GPL was revised for clarification purpose and 
renamed to GNU General Public License. 
The second major community-based model of production came from University of California at Berkeley. 
Berkeley had received a copy of Unix version 6 from Ken Thompson whilst he was on a teaching 
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sabbatical. This was the beginning of a series of events that would help establish Berkeley as a dominant 
force in the Unix community. Back in 1976, two Berkeley graduate students, Chuck Haley and Bill Joy 
added some key enhancements to this version of Unix and named it Berkeley Software Distribution 
(BSD). BSD soon became the academic Unix development platform. If users sent their hacks, patches and 
fixes to Berkeley, and they were accepted, the contributed code was added to the BSD code base. And to 
avoid problems with possible copyright violations, license fees were paid to AT&T for any distribution of 
Unix variant. For instance, all BSD distributions in the early 1980s included a reference to AT&T’s licence. 
However, there was a major caveat to this, as majority of the code that made up BSD was created by 
AT&T, thus subject to AT&T’s distribution license. Nonetheless, the ever-rising licence payments soon 
became a burden for many. Also, companies, which used only part of the code and built stand-alone 
networking products for the PC markets requested a separate version for their needs. In order to get 
around the legal complications and meet the demands, Berkeley undertook an ambitious task and re-
wrote all of the original AT&T code and created a “clean” version of BSD. Shortly after, Unix System 
Laboratories (USL), a majority owned subsidiary of AT&T took action against BSD for copyright 
infringement and trade secret violation. Subsequently, University of California was added as another 
defendant and it counterclaimed against AT&T as AT&T had also used Berkeley code in their Unix 
distribution. The dispute was resolved after Novell bought USL in 1993. In January 1994, the settlement 
was finalised and the result was that three files were removed from BSD and another 70 were agreed to 
belong to USL. 
GPL (general public licence) contains a reciprocity clause which makes it viral, i.e. any modification needs 
to be released under the same licence. It is also restrictive from the perspectives of commercial use. 
Whereas BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) dropped the reciprocity clause. BSD licence makes it 
possible to freely develop and redistribute BSD Unix variants. McKusick (1999) explains: 
“the licensing terms were liberal. A licensee could release the code modified or unmodified in source or 
binary form with no accounting or royalties to Berkeley. The only requirement was the copyright 
notices in the source file be left intact and that products that incorporated the code indicate in their 
documentation that the product contained code from the Uni of California and its contributors” 
In the early 1990s, the widespread diffusion of Internet access led to a dramatic acceleration of open 
source activity. The volume of contributions and diversity of contributors expanded sharply, and 
numerous new open source projects emerged, most notably, Linux, developed by Linus Torvalds. 
In 1991, both Jolitz and Torvalds were unknowingly working in parallel on writing a variation to Unix to 
run on the Intel 386 platform. Torvalds, a young Finnish university student began writing his own Unix-
compatible operating system kernel based on a Dutch university’s Unix teaching tool called Minux. This 
project later became known as Linux; very quickly gained popularity and developed around it a large, 
decentralized, voluntary development community that would later form the template of future open 
source software projects. In January 1992, Torvalds decided to license Linux with GPL (Torvalds & 
Diamond, 2001). The subsequent success of Linux accompanied with GNU and other free software led 
GPL to greater popularity both inside and outside the hacker circle. By 1994, when Linux version 1.0 was 
released, the Linux community had firmly established itself as the new centre in the modern open-source 
development movement. 
Arguably, after the BSD and popularity of Linux, open source has passed the “acid tests” for business 
credibility. Escalating corporate interest in open-source software was growing parallel with the Internet 
boom. However, the BSD and GPL licensing models and Stallman’s free software ideology remained 
ambiguous to the technical audience, particularly to individuals who perceive free software as anti-
commercial. This had led to the founding of the open source initiative (OSI). His founding father, Eric 
Raymond catalysed the momentum into what it is known as today, the open-source movement. In his 
influential essay “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, he explained his version of open-source software 
development model as corporate friendly, and endorsed several licenses as an alternative to GPL. The 
launch of OSI first attracted the attention of a web-browser company, Netscape Communications 
Corporation (hereinafter, Netscape). Notably, Netscape was losing its market share to Microsoft and was 
eager to experiment radical alternatives. Distinctively separate himself from Stallman’s ideals, Raymond 
managed to persuade Netscape to adopt the open-source strategy in January 1998. 
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The contentious relationship between FSF and OSI has made the concepts of open source and freedom 
ambivalent (Berry, 2004). The differences between GPL and non-GPL licenses with respect to exclusion 
and subtractability have underscored the inherent tensions and potential conflicts between pubic and 
private interests. On the one hand, GPL is to ensure freedoms and ethical practices form a contributor’s 
perspective. On the other hand, non-GPL mechanisms provide an alternative to attract private investment 
and to safeguard private returns. GPL intends to create a public good as a means to stop private 
appropriation. It bears the characteristics of low exclusion and low subtraction. BSD offers a private 
investor some degree of subtraction. Non-GPL licenses (such as Apache license sanctioned by OSI) offer a 
private investor an unreserved and unrestricted level of subtraction and the options of non- disclosure of 
any modifications to the original code base. 
At the heart of the community-based production, Richard Stallman is highly influential; however, power 
also equates struggles. As observed, the community is a rather heterogeneous social system with 
competition on leadership, mixed opinions, alliances, etc. But most visible efforts of Stallman’s are Linux, 
GPL Licences and the concept of free software. During the recent years, FSF has released a less restrictive 
license LGPL to encourage reuse of software libraries. Stallman writes: 
“When a free library's features are readily available for proprietary software through other alternative 
libraries... the library cannot give free software any particular advantage, so it is better to use the 
Lesser GPL for that library.” 
Stallman recognizes the conditions for sanctioning non-subtractability especially where there exists an 
alternative in the marketplace. This seems to be a necessity for code to be used in commercial products, 
and to survive the competition from other commercial software and even compete with other open source 
software products. This gradual movement towards the middle ground underlines the complementary 
benefits that market-based production can contribute to the community-based production. However, the 
complementary benefits also come with vulnerabilities as a result of the asymmetry between open and 
closed source models of innovation.  
 
Table 1: Background information of CyanogenMod and Makerbot 
 
Preliminary Findings 
To explore the middle ground of co-organizing community and market-based production further, we 
intend to extend our model of governing the commons to include open hardware. Understanding from 
hardware commons will complement the extant scholarly work on its software counterpart, considering 
that both software and hardware utilize a similar rule-based system. Our preliminary search has identified 
two such cases – CyanogenMod and Makerbot. Both cases involve the use of non-GPL license, which 
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presents a high subtractability condition to induce contributions from both nonprofit and business actors. 
Table 1 provides some of the background information of these two cases. 
The CyanogenMod (CM) open source project started in 2008 with the aim of giving users control over 
the customization of their mobile devices and content experiences. The CM project has been focusing on 
reimagining the mobile operating system of the Android Open Source Project (AOSP). The project is 
unique with a new generation of hackers who have to deal not only with software but also with the 
interfaces and the integration challenges between software and hardware. The contributors belonged to 
an emerging ROM modification community, seeking to develop open source software, which is device 
specific. With an increase in contribution and a large user base, CM presented the largest non- 
commercial ROM project in mobile handsets. In 2009, it sought to combine community with market-
based production as an alternative to compete againist Android operating systems. Since then, it is 
constantly subject to the scrutiny of its developer and user base and notably the control and commercial 
threats from other market players including Google.  
In 2009 Google sent CM a cease and desist letter regarding its inclusion of Google’s apps. The chief 
developer of CM was conciliatory and wrote in his blog: 
“The issue that’s raised is the redistribution of Google’s proprietary applications like Maps, GTalk, 
Market, and YouTube. These are not part of the open source project and are only part of “Google 
Experience” devices. They are Google’s intellectual property and I intend to respect that… I’d love for 
Google to hand over the keys to the kingdom and let us all have it for free, but that’s not going to 
happen. And who can blame them?” 
The conciliatory move followed its plan to come up with its own brand of CM phone. And because it does 
not have its own app market, the company will have to rely on Google AppStore and subject its device to 
the requirements under Google’s Compatibility Test Suite (CTS). Nonetheless, the infringement had 
expedited CM’s momentum to bring forth its own series of open source apps. The owner Steve Kondik 
wrote in a blogpost: 
“What’s most important to me is that anyone can get the code, hack on it and change whatever you 
want, build it, and flash it to your device... The new camera app, Focal, is jus the start. Without giving 
too much away, invoking teaser videos, or giving EFAs, I can confidently say that awesome things are 
going to keep coming. Watch out :)” 
All the software developed under the CM Project is released under the Apache Software License version 2 
(ASL2). This includes the license for the CM ROM, which is inherited from the AOSP. Under ASL2, it 
allows CM to incorporate and redistribute user contributions. The public ownership and control of all the 
contributions made to the project is further enforced through the use of the Contributor License 
Agreement. In 2013, CM secured $7 million in startup capital to create and form the CyanogenMod Inc 
company. This move from a non-commercial to a commercial entity resulted in discords within the ROM 
community. The contentions revolved around the unethical practices in monetizing community 
contribution without rewarding contributors. Nonetheless, the infringement had expedited CM’s 
momentum to bring forth its own series of open source apps. The owner Steve Kondik wrote in a blogpost: 
Despite CyanogenMod has public ownership over the modified ROM through the Contributor License 
Agreement, the misappropriation of the Focal camera app is particularly damaging to the contributors 
and users alike. The sticking point was that CM wanted the Focal app developer to relicense and change 
the GPL status of the app. Because any modifications to the Focal (carried out by CyanogenMod Inc 
company as a paid service to make hardware specific enhancement) will be bounded by trade secrets. 
Under GPL, CM will have to make the modifications publicly available. Nonetheless, CM used the 
Contributor licence Agreement to claim public ownership of the Focal app. In his blogpost, the Focal 
developer wrote: 
“this wasn’t legally right: the software [Focal app] is licensed as GPL, the repository on CyanogenMod’s 
github is forked from my GitHub, so it didn’t go through the Contributor License Agreement (which only 
applies to Gerrit submissions), and the Berne convention can prove through the commits history that I 
did fully write the app, and not Cyanogen Inc. - and even if the CLA would apply, it only allows them to 
sublicense the software, not relicense or dual-license it without my permission” 
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The backlash towards CM’s misappropriation of Focal resulted in its removal from its software bundle. 
And since then most of the software development in the kernel was carried out by CM’s employed 
developers, and as one of the developer commenting that 
““by users for users” is going to go by the wayside now that there are investors with a financial stake in 
it. Sure, the first few releases will be “see, there’s no evil here. Everything you’ve known is still here”, but 
slowly they’ve going to start changing things to make CyanogenMod more mainstream to the average 
user. I do feel like CyanogenMod is going to lose a lot of the hardcorers who have supported it” 
Makerbot begun as a new start-up hardware company in 2009. It was producing and selling self–
assembly 3D–printer kits to the makers and hobbyists. To compliment the sales of its kits, Makerbot 
created an online design community, Thingivese to encourage free sharing of 3D–design files amongst 
hobbyist designers and Makers. A few years later, in reaction to external threats of cloning, Makerbot 
decided to make its third generation hardware 3D–printers and its software peripherals closed source. 
This impromptu action was to protect its intellectual property (IP) from further duplication and to limit 
the liabilities of open source practices in impeding hardware sales. Yet this abrupt transition from an open 
and attribution-based practice to a closed and defensive practice threatens the survivability of the open 
hardware business model and has an adverse affect on its relationship with its core contributors and 
users.  
The 3D–printing open source hardware (Reprap, Ultimaker) consists of hardware and software where 
there is the positive expectation (from Makers), as a consequence of the reciprocal clause in open source 
contractual agreements, that these duo components should be free and open. Though with Makerbot this 
is not the case, as the institution gradually transitions towards the proprietary route and changes 
contractual conditions, with the release of different variants of Makerbot’s 3D–printers. Bre Pettis, one of 
the co-founders of Makerbot had infamously suggested that “Bits are free, atoms cost money” (Pettis, 
2009). In his analogy, Bits refer to intangible products, like the digital design files used in the process of 
3D-printing. Atoms refer to tangible products, like the physical materials used to construct 3D-printers 
and end products. The proposition made by Pettis is comparatively similar to Gates statement to 
Homebrew Computing Club made forty years earlier. While their views on software may differ they both 
nevertheless recognize the market value of hardware over software and the complimentary relationship of 
both components. Although the relationship between Thingiverse and Makerbot is subject to the licensing 
mechanisms including creative common licenses, the ownership of contributions is subject to terms of 
services similar to the contributor license agreement with the CyanogenMod case. Contributors can 
withdraw their original designs, and yet any subsequent derivatives and user-led modifications made on 
Thingiverse will be the property of Makerbot. Hence, withdrawal as a strategy is ineffective to safeguard 
the commons. The closure of the source code has resulted in escalation of discords between 
makers/designers and Makerbot. Despite the backlash and boycott towards the closure of source code of 
its 3D printers, Makerbot justified on its defensive strategy with a growth strategy by hiring software and 
hardware engineers. This has resulted in an increase of semi-professional designers in buying their next 
generation of 3D printers 
With archival data including blogs and user forums available, both cases provide a rich research site to 
further theorize the relationship between difficulty of exclusion and subtractability and offer the 
opportunity to examine their significance in governing software and hardware commons. 
Discussion & conclusion 
Open source software projects are often said to offer a fertile and rich middle ground to examine how 
private investments and collective actions can come and work together, delivering the best of both worlds 
(von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). However, the inherent tensions between nonprofit and business 
interests are seldom addressed despite the contentions from within the open source software 
communities (Berry, 2004). As community-based model of production progressively moves towards the 
middle ground (marked by A and B in Figure 2) by adopting a less restrictive, a non-GPL type of licensing 
regime, it is often encountered with resistance and threats from both community and markets, but it can 
potentially facilitate business investment without crowding out nonprofit contribution.  
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Figure 2. Co-organizing community and market-based production 
Prior research has been unwittingly treating the commons as a public good despite the questionable 
assumptions of whether it is indeed a public good or a common pool resource (O'Mahony, 2003). It has 
overemphasized the importance of public good characteristics, such that it has resulted in under 
theorizing the relationship between exclusion and subtractability from the perspectives of both nonprofit 
and business contributors. Our premise is that the co-organizing community and market production in 
the middle ground can move away from the threats presented to business investors under low difficulty of 
exclusion (through GPL and its variants), and at the same time, create the condition of high 
subtractability to attract business investment. However, co-organizing community and market-based 
production requires a delicate balancing act between contributions and investment with unknown 
ramifications. In our future study, we will explore the social and business dilemma presented to nonprofit 
and business contributors, as they are both subject to free riding. Such research is necessary and 
important if scholars are to better explain how community and market-based production can more 
effectively adapt, innovate and survive in the long term.  
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